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Abstract
Quantum cognition is a recent and rapidely growing field. In this paper we de-
velop an expected utility theory in a context of non-classical (quantum) uncertainty.
We replace the classical state space with a Hilbert space which allows introducing
the concept of quantum lottery. Within that framework we formulate sufficient and
necessary axioms on preferences over quantum lotteries to establish a representation
theorem. We show that demanding the consistency of choice behavior conditional
on new information is equivalent to the von Neuman-Lu¨ders postulate applied to
beliefs. In our context, dynamic consistency is shown not to secure Savage’s Sure
Thing Principle (in its dynamic version). Finally, we discuss the interpretation and
value of our results for rationality and behavioral economics.
1 Introduction
A central question facing any theory of decision making under uncertainty is how pref-
erences are updated to incorporate new information. Dynamic consistency is the re-
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quirement that ex-ante contingent choices are respected by updated preferences. This
consistency is implicit in the standard way of thinking about a dynamic choice problem
as equivalent to a single ex ante choice to which one is committed, and is thus ubiquitous
in economic modeling. Under (objective and subjective) expected utility, updating pref-
erences by applying Bayes’ rule is the standard way to update. Why is this so? Dynamic
consistency is the primary justification for Bayesian updating as shown in Ghirardato
(2002).
Dynamic consistency rationalizes the well-established theory of updating under ex-
pected utility, but what does it implies for updating in a more general uncertainty envi-
ronment? This paper revisits Savage in a conditional world in a way similar to Ghirardato
(2002) with the essential difference that we are dealing with non-classical (quantum) un-
certainty. Fishburn (1970 p. 161) writes ”It is generally assumed that (1) the decision
maker does not know the ”true state,” (2) the act he selects has no effect on the state that
obtains, and (3) the state that obtains affects the outcome of the decision in conjunction
with the act selected”. In this paper we are interested in situations where the choice of
the act affects the state (we relax Fishburn’s assumption (2)). A related line of motivation
appeals to the growing interest for applications of elements of the mathematical formalism
of Quantum Mechanics to psychology, social sciences and in particular in decision-making
(see e.g., Brandenburger and La Mura (2015) and Busemeyer and Bruza (2012) for an
overview of the field). The approach has shown successful in explaining a large variety
of behavioral anomalies in decision-making ranging from cognitive dissonance, preference
reversal, conjunction fallacy, disjunction effects to framing effects. This line of research is
gaining recognition with a broader public as witnessed by recent publications in popular
scientific magazines (e.g., Sciences et Vie, Sept. 2015).
Applying elements of the quantum formalism has also shown fruitful in explaining
anomalies in information processing. There exists a large amount of evidence in psy-
chology about order effects in the processing of information. In Section 7 we discuss
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Bergus et al. (1998) experiment that exhibited a significant impact on physicians’ di-
agnosis of the order in which they received information. Similar results exist regarding
judicial decision-making. Various behavioral hypothesis have been proposed to explain
order effect appealing to cognitive biases such as primacy, recency, saliency effects. Quan-
tum cognition offers an explanation without appealing to any cognitive bias. Instead,
it proposes that the mental image of the ”world” relevant to decision-making behaves
as a quantum-like object (see the Section 7 for a detailed presentation). The emphasis
is on the ”Bohr complementarity”1 of a multiplicity of incompatible ”perspectives”2 on
the world. Order effects arises as the expression of these incompatibilities and associated
non-commutativity of measurements. In contrast, classical cognition assumes a unique
perspective expressed by the existence of a single finest partition of the world which calls
for Bayes’ rule in updating.
The quantum cognitive explanation not only fits experimental data (Trueblood and
Busemeyer (2012) and Wang et al. (2014)), it also lends itself to a meaningful psycholog-
ical interpretation (Dubois and Lambert-Mogiliansky (2016)). But can people who hold
a quantum like representation of the world behave dynamically consistently, can they be
”rational”? Indeed the above mentioned behavioral explanations for order effects lead to
dynamic inconsistency of choice behavior. In contrast with quantum cognition, order ef-
fect and dynamic consistency are compatible. We derive an updating rule that guarantees
that choice behavior is consistent with a stable preference relationship when information
processing exhibits order effects.
Besides the recent success in explaining behavioral phenomena, there are other rea-
sons for turning to Quantum Mechanics in social sciences. Similarities between human
sciences and quantum physics were early recognized by the founders of quantum mechan-
1A set of properties are said to be Bohr complementary when they inform about a system but yet
cannot be measured simultaneously. Most well-known examples in Physics is position and momentum
and the spin of a particle along different angles.
2The term ”perspective” is used in the sense of Dubois and Lambert-Mogiliansky, it corresponds to a
resolution of the Hilbert space that represents the agent’s cognition. We provide a precise definition of
”incomptibility” in the text.
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ics, including Bohr and Heisenberg. In particular, Bohr was heavily influenced by the
psychology and philosophy of knowledge of Harald Hoffding. A fundamental similarity
stems from the fact that in both fields, the object of investigation cannot be separated
from the process of investigation. This is expressed by the non-commutativity of measure-
ments. The mathematical formalism of quantum Mechanics was developed to respond to
that epistemological challenge: how can we ”do science” about things that change as we
try to learn about them (see Introduction in Bitbol (2009)). This historical and epistemo-
logical argument further justify exploring the properties of this mathematical formalism
in the study of human behavioral phenomena.
In this article, we substitute the Boolean lattice of events with a more general lattice of
projectors in the Hilbert space as the suitable framework for modelling decision-making.
The notions are introduced progressively and require no previous knowledge of Quantum
Mechanics or Hilbert spaces. We show that a natural definition of a quantum lottery
allows for the formulation of decision theoretical axioms similar to the classical ones with
one exception. We need axiom A5 that secures the stability of preferences over lotteries
defined over different perspectives (resolutions of the state space). This axiom (that we
labelled ”no-framing”) is trivially satisfied in the classical world (all lotteries can be ex-
pressed in a single finest partition(resolution) of the state space). We next show that the
von Neumann-Lu¨ders projection postulate of Quantum Mechanics used as an updating
rule is both necessary and sufficient for dynamic consistency of preferences. In our context
the von Neumann-Lu¨ders postulate arises from purely behavioral considerations that is
from a requirement of consistency applying to conditional (on new information) prefer-
ence relations. Interestingly, the specificity of non-classical uncertainty (also referred to
as ”contextuality”) is shown to imply a failure of the so-called ”recursive dynamic con-
sistency” (a dynamic version of the Sure Thing Principle). In a final section we discuss
some implications of the results for rationality and behavioral economics.
There exists a few earlier works addressing quantum probabilities in the context of
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decision-making. These include Deutsch (1999), Pitowsky (2003), Lehrer and Shmaya
(2006), Danilov and Lambert-Mogiliansky (2010) and Gyntelberg and Hansen (2012)).
In particular Pitowky writes about ”betting on quantum measurements” but he is not
working with preference relations. Interestingly, he formulates a rule saying that the
probability for any specific outcome is independent of the specific measurement that
yields it as one of its possible results. This rule is very much in line with our axiom A5.
Lehrer and Shamya propose a subjective approach to quantum probabilities but they do
not work with quantum lotteries. Danilov and Lambert-Mogiliansky develop an expected
utility theory in a general non-classical uncertainty context (ortho-modular lattices) but
the analysis is static and in terms of utils. Gyltenberg and Hansen (2012) work with
Hilbert space to develop an expected utility theory with subjective events. Their static
setting shows similarities with ours. However their analysis appeals to a large number of
axioms - 12 where we have 5 - and they do not address the issue of dynamic consistency.
The present work is a contribution to both decision theory and the foundations of
quantum cognition. We extend previous works in two directions. First, we provide a
complete characterization of expected utility theory under non-classical (quantum) un-
certainty: we provide a concise and intuitive formulation of sufficient and necessary axioms
in terms of preferences over quantum lotteries. Most importantly, this construction allows
for a transparent characterization of dynamic consistency of choice behavior in such an
environment. Finally, we discuss the value of the approach and illustrate it relying on
experimental results from medical decision-making.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we introduce the concept of quantum lottery
which gives the opportunity to define basic elements of the mathematical formalism.
Next, we provide an example of preferences over quantum lotteries and formulate the
axioms needed to obtain a first theorem. In section 5 we proceed the other way around
and characterize nice preferences to obtain our central representation theorem. In the
next section we address the issue of information updating and formulate our theorem of
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dynamic consistency. Thereafter we discuss the value of our results and end with some
concluding remarks.
2 Quantum lotteries
We are interested in a decision-maker’s preferences over what we call quantum lotteries. In
this section we define the notion of quantum or Q-lottery. But we shall start by reminding
basic facts about roulette and so called ”horse” lotteries. Any lottery entails an uncertain
payoff: a prize is received depending on the realization of some event. We understand the
term event as the outcome of a measurement. And the lotteries described below (roulette,
horse and quantum lotteries) differ essentially in the type of measurement that is being
performed.
Roulette lotteries. Assume that we have a set X of prizes. A roulette lottery (with
prizes in X) is defined by a collection of prizes x1, ..., xr together with the probabilities
p1, ..., pr (with pi ≥ 0 and
∑
i pi = 1) for obtaining the corresponding prize. We could think
of it in the following way: a measurement in the form of a ‘roulette’ is performed and
gives an outcome in the set {1, ..., r}. The probability of outcome i is pi and, depending
on the outcome of this ‘measurement’, a prize xi is paid.
Obviously, such lotteries can be identified with (simple) probabilistic measures on
the set X. We denote by ∆(X) the set of such measures (or lotteries). Under well-
known conditions, von Neumann and Morgenstein obtained that the utility of a lottery
l = (x1, p1; ...;xr, pr) for a decision-maker (dm) is defined by a number U(l) =
∑
i piu(xi)
where u : X → R is a ‘utility function’ defined on the set X of all possible prizes.
Horse lotteries.
The next concept is that of a ‘horse lottery’ or an ‘act’ in Savage’s terminology. The
decision-maker assigns probabilities p1, ..., pr (with pi ≥ 0 and
∑
i pi = 1) to the different
outcomes. A horse lottery is a function f : S → X from the set S of states of nature
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to the set X of prizes. A measurement is performed in the form of a ‘horse race’ and,
depending on the result of this measurement, the corresponding prize is paid.
Again under suitable conditions the utility of a horse lottery f can be written as
U(f) =
∑
s psu(f(s)), where u : X → R is a utility function, and p is a (subjective)
probability measure on the set S. A considerable simplification was achieved by Anscombe
and Aumann when taking roulette lotteries as prizes. They define a horse lottery as a
function f : S → ∆ (X) . In particular, this allows to view S as a set with a finite number
of elements.
In order to smoothly move over to quantum lotteries, it is convenient to present horse
lotteries slightly differently. We interpret any subset of S as an event and a partition is
a (finite) collection of events A1, ...., Ar (r is an arbitrary number) which are mutually
exclusive and exhaustive. That is Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ if i 6= j, and A1 ∪ ... ∪ Ar = S. In these
terms a horse lottery is described by a collection x1, ..., xr of prizes; prize xi is given if the
event Ai occurs.
Quantum lotteries.
A quantum lottery is also a bet on the outcome of a measurement, but now a quantum
one. A measurement of some ‘observable’ is performed, and, depending on the result
obtained, our dm receives some prize. To formalize the notion of quantum measurement
we have to modify the previously defined notions of state, event and partition. We do this
in the following way. The set S is replaced by some Hilbert space H. An event is a linear
subspace in H. Finally, the notion of partition is replaced by the notion of orthogonal
decomposition, that is a resolution of H as a (finite) sum of orthogonal events-subspaces,
H = V1⊕ ...⊕Vr (r again is an arbitrary number). We should understand this orthogonal
decomposition as a measurement; if such a measurement is performed then one and only
one of the events A1, ..., Ar occurs. If the prize xi is paid when event Ai occurs, we speak
about a quantum lottery.
The main difference with the standard (classical) state space model is that the Hilbert
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space model allows for measurements that cannot be performed simultaneously; they are
incompatible in general. And, as a consequence of the performance of a measurement,
the state of the system can change. Below we give precise definitions, after recalling some
elementary notions about Hilbert spaces.
Hilbert spaces.
Consider the field R of real numbers or the field C of complex numbers. In the latter
case z¯ denotes the complex conjugate of (complex) number z. The notions introduced
below can be defined for complex and real numbers in a similar manner. We limit ourselves
to the complex case, the real case is even simpler.
Definition. Let H be a vector space over C. An Hermitian form on H is a mapping
(., .) : H × H → C such that a) it is linear in the first argument; b) (v, w) = (w, v). In
particular, (v, v) is a real number. c) (v, v) ≥ 0 for any v ∈ H, and = 0 only for v = 0.
Vectors v and w are called orthogonal if (v, w) = 0; in this case (w, v) = 0 as well.
A Hilbert space is a vector space H endowed with a Hermitian form, which is complete
relatively to the norm |v| =√(v, v). In the following we shall only be dealing with finite
dimensional space so the condition of completeness is automatically fulfilled. Further we
let H denote some Hilbert space.
Definition. An event is a closed vector subspace of H.3
The set of events is denoted by P(H). The operations of intersection and sum give
a lattice structure in P(H). For an event V , the opposite event is given by subspace
V ⊥ consisting of vectors w ∈ H orthogonal to all vectors from V . V = (0) is the least
(‘impossible’) event and V = H is the most (‘trivial’) event. Two events V and W are
orthogonal if every vector from V is orthogonal to every vector from W .
Definition. An orthogonal decomposition (OD) of H is a finite family (Vi, i ∈ I) of
events Vi, such that
3In the finite-dimensional case all subspaces are closed.
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a) Vi and Vj are orthogonal for i 6= j;
b) the sum of all Vi is equal to H.
Example 1. Let V be an event. Then the pair V and V ⊥ forms a (‘dichotomous’)
orthogonal decomposition of H.
Given an orthogonal decomposition (Vi, i ∈ I), we can consider Vi as an exhaustive
collection of mutually exclusive events. Therefore we can form a ”quantum” lottery which
gives some prize xi when event Vi occurs: Vi ⇒ xi, i ∈ I. The system of events (Vi) is
viewed as a measurement device. The performance of a measurement with this device
gives one and only one of the event Vi; in this case our decision-maker gets prize xi.
Definition. A quantum lottery (Q-lottery) is an OD (Vi, i ∈ I) with an accompanying
collection of prizes (xi, i ∈ I). We denote such a Q-lottery as
∑
i xi⊗Vi. The OD (Vi, i ∈ I)
is called the base of the lottery.
As Anscombe-Aumann, we shall allow roulette lotteries as prizes. The set of Q-lotteries
(with prizes from ∆(X)) will be denoted as QL(H,∆(X)) or simply as QL(H) because a
specification of the set X does not play an essential role. We would like to explore ‘nice’
preference relations on the set QL(H). In the next section we provide a way to construct
such preferences and investigate their properties. Thereafter we proceed the other way
around and characterize the set of nice preferences.
3 Construction of ”nice” preferences
Let us recall that the ‘utility’ of a horse lottery is constructed by means of two ingredients:
a linear (affine) utility function u : ∆ (X)→ R and a probability p on the Boolean lattice
of subsets of S. To realize this program for Q-lotteries, we have to define the notion of
‘probability’ on the lattice P(H).
Definition. A probability measure on the lattice P(H) of events in a Hilbert space H
is a function µ : P(H)→ R such that
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a) µ(V ) ≥ 0 for any event V ;
b)
∑
i µ(Vi) = 1 for any OD (Vi, i ∈ I).
Note, that then µ(H) = 1 and µ(V ) + µ(W ) = µ(V ⊕W ) for orthogonal V and W .
We next provide a couple of examples of probability measures on P(H). Here and
further we assume that H is a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. For an event V we denote
by dim(V ) the dimension of V . We give two examples of probability measures.
Example 2. The first example is very simple. Set µ(V ) = dim(V )/dim (H). It is
easy to check that µ is a probability measure, a uniform distribution.
Example 3. More interesting is our second example. Let e be a vector in H with
unit length, (e, e) = 1. For an event V , let eV and e
⊥
V be the unique vectors in V and
V ⊥ respectively such that e = eV + e⊥V . Then define µe(V ) as (eV , e). We assert that µe
is a probability measure. Indeed,
(eV , e) = (eV , eV + e
⊥
V ) = (eV , eV ) + (eV , e
⊥
V ) = (eV , eV ) ≥ 0.
In other words, µe(V ) is the square of the length of eV . Moreover, if (Vi, i ∈ I)) is an OD,
then ∑
i
µe(Vi) =
∑
i
(eVi , e) = (
∑
i
eVi , e) = (e, e) = 1,
This equality can be considered as Pythagore’s theorem. This also referred to as Born
rule in Quantum Mechanics.
Given a linear ‘utility function’ u on ∆ (X) and a probability measure µ on P(H), we
can define the ‘(u, µ)-utility’, Uu,µ(σ) of any Q-lottery σ =
∑
i li ⊗ Vi as
Uu,µ(σ) =
∑
i
u(li)µ(Vi),
and the corresponding preference relation =u,µ on QL(H). Namely, for Q-lotteries we
have σ  τ if U(u,µ)(σ) ≤ U(u,µ)(τ). Below we list some ‘nice’ properties that a preference
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relation  of the form (u,µ) satisfies.
Weak order.
A1. The preference relation  is a weak order, that is complete and transitive.
This follows from its representation via the utility U(u,µ).
To formulate the next three properties we need the notion of a mixture (or a convex
combination) of Q-lotteries having the same base (Vi, i ∈ I). Let σ =
∑
i li ⊗ Vi and
τ =
∑
imi ⊗ Vi be two Q-lotteries, and α ∈ [0, 1]; we define their mixture ασ + (1− α)τ
as Q-lottery
∑
i(αli + (1− α)mi)⊗ Vi.
Independence.
A2. Let σ, τ, ϕ be Q-lotteries with the same base, and α ∈ [0, 1]. If σ  τ then
ασ + (1− α)ϕ  ατ + (1− α)ϕ.
It follows from the equality U(ασ + (1 − α)ϕ) = αU(σ) + (1 − α)U(ϕ) which is a
consequence of the linearity of the utility U
Continuity.
A3. Let σ, τ, ϕ be Q-lotteries with σ, τ defined on the same base, and σ ≺ ϕ ≺ τ . Then
there exists α and β (0 < α, β < 1) such that ασ + (1− α)τ ≺ ϕ and ϕ ≺ βσ + (1− β)τ .
Indeed, U(σ) < U(ϕ) < U(τ). Therefore U(ϕ) > αU(σ) + (1 − α)U(τ) for some
α ∈ ]0, 1[ and U(ϕ) < βU(σ) + (1− β)U(τ) for some β ∈ ]0, 1[ . So
U(ϕ) > U(ασ+ (1−α)τ) and U(ϕ) < U(βσ+ (1− β)τ). Note, that here we only use
the fact that σ and τ have the same base.
Monotonicity.
To formulate this property, we define (with help of the preference relation  on
QL(H)) the derived preference relation L on the set of ordinary lotteries ∆(X). For
lotteries l and m we set l L m if l⊗H  m⊗H. Here l⊗H denotes a trivial Q-lottery,
getting with certainty the prize l, and similarly for m⊗H.
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Note that the preference L on ∆(X) is represented by the function u. Indeed,
Uu,µ(l ⊗H) = u(l)µ(H) = u(l).
A4. Let σ =
∑
i li ⊗ Vi and τ =
∑
imi ⊗ Vi be Q-lotteries with the same base. If
li L mi for any i ∈ I then σ  τ .
This property can be considered as a version of the sure-thing principle of Savage. It
is a trivial consequence of the non-negativity of µ(Vi).
No-framing.
The previous three properties were about Q-lotteries defined on the same base or OD.
The last property A5 binds lotteries with different (although ”compatible”) ODs. Let
σ =
∑
i li ⊗ Vi and τ =
∑
jmj ⊗Wj be two Q-lotteries based on ODs (Vi, i ∈ I) and
(Vj, j ∈ J) respectively.
Definition. We say that τ is a refinement of σ, if there exists a mapping ψ : J → I
such that (for any j ∈ J)
a) Wj ⊆ Vψ(j);
b) mj = lψ(j).
In words, the Q-lottery τ refines (subdivides) every event Vi but leaves the associated
prizes unchanged. Indeed, we claim that
Lemma 1. For any i ∈ I, Vi =
⊕
j,ψ(j)=iWj.
Proof. Fix i ∈ I and let Ji = ψ−1({i}). We show that Vi =
⊕
j∈Ji Wj. Since Wj ⊆ Vi
for any j ∈ Ji, we clearly have Vi ⊇
⊕
j∈Ji Wj. Moreover, let v ∈ Vi, and write in the form
v =
∑
j∈J wj with each wj ∈ Wj. To conclude, it is sufficient to show that wj = 0 for any
j /∈ Ji. Fix j /∈ Ji and i′ = ψ(j) 6= i. Then, v ∈ Vi and wj ∈ WJ ⊆ Vi′ so that v and wj
are orthogonal. But then (wj, wj) = (v, wj) = 0 so that wj = 0. So indeed v ∈
⊕
j∈Ji Wj.

A5. If τ is a refinement of σ then these Q-lotteries are equivalent for the DM: σ ∼ τ .
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Indeed, as we have seen, Vi =
⊕
j,i=ψ(j)Wj. Therefore,
U(σ) =
∑
i
u(li)µ(Vi) =
∑
i
u(li)µ(
⊕
j,i=ψ(j)
Wj) =
∑
i
u(li)
∑
j,i=ψ(j)
µ(Wj)
=
∑
i
∑
j,i=ψ(j)
u(li)µ(Wj) =
∑
i
∑
j,i=ψ(j)
u(mj)µ(Wj) =
∑
j
u(mj)µ(Wj) = U(τ).
Interestingly, this axiom is implicit in the Savage and Anscombe-Aumann frameworks.
However in generalizations of these frameworks it must be imposed explicitly see e.g.,
Cohen and Jaffray (1980). They formulate an axiom of ”non influence of formalization”
very similar to our axiom A5. There are also other works that reject that axiom in order
to allow for framing effects see Ahn and Ergin (2010).
Definition. A preference relation  on the set QL(H) of Q-lotteries is nice if it is
endowed with properties A1−A5 (or satisfies the axioms A1−A5).
The arguments above imply
Proposition 1. A preference relation u,µ on QL(H) constructed by means of an
affine utility function u : ∆ (X)→ R and a probabilistic measure µ on P(H) is nice.
In the next section we show that the inverse also is true.
4 Characterization of nice preferences on Q-lotteries
The previous section identified a number of axioms on preferences necessary for an ex-
pected utility representation (Proposition 1). The Theorem below shows that these axioms
are also sufficient. Thus the axioms characterizing expected utility over quantum lotteries
are very similar to the ones used by Anscombe-Aumann in a classical uncertainty context.
Theorem 1. Suppose that  is a nice preference relation on the set QL(H). Then
there exists an affine function u on ∆ (X) and a probabilistic measure µ on P(H) such
that =u,µ.
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Moreover, if the preference  is not trivial (that is there exist Q-lotteries σ and τ such
that σ ≺ τ) then µ is unique and u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
Proof of Theorem 1. If preference  is trivial then the assertion is trivially true.
Indeed, we can take u to be constant and take an arbitrary µ. So, from now on, we
assume that preference  is nontrivial. Let us remind of the derived relation L on
∆(X): l  m iff l ⊗ H  m ⊗ H. As a consequence of nontriviality, A4 and A5, we
obtain that the preference L is not trivial; we fix two (ordinary) lotteries l∗ and l∗ such
that l∗ ≺L l∗. A function u : ∆ (X) → R is said to be normalized if u(l∗) = 0 and
u(l∗) = 1.
Claim 1. For any OD V = (V1, . . . , Vn), there exists a normalized function uV on
∆ (X) and a probability measure µV on the set of indexes I such that, for any l1, . . . ln ∈
∆(X) and m1, . . .mn ∈ ∆(X):
∑
i
li ⊗ Vi 
∑
i
mi ⊗ Vi ⇐⇒
∑
i
uV(li)µV(i) ≤
∑
i
uV(mi)µV(i).
Moreover, both uV and µV are unique.
Proof. Let QLV stand for the set of Q-lotteries with base V , and let V denote the
restriction of preference  to QLV . Each Q-lottery σ =
∑
i li ⊗ Vi ∈ QLV can be seen
as a ‘horse lottery’ f : I → ∆(X ), where f(i) = li for any i ∈ I. Moreover, thanks to
axioms A1−A4, the relation P satisfies all the Anscombe-Aumann axioms. Therefore,
by theorem 13.2 in Fishburn (1970), we obtain a utility function uV on ∆ (X) and a
probability measure µV ∈ ∆(I) that achieve the representation stated in Claim 1. The
uniqueness of the probability vector µV is also given by this theorem. However, uV is
unique only up to positive affine transformation. But then, we can assume without loss
of generality that it is normalized. Normalization gives the uniqueness of uV . 
Claim 2. For any Q-lottery σ, there exists an ordinary lottery l ∈ ∆(X) such that
σ ≈ l ⊗H.
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Proof. Suppose that σ =
∑
i li ⊗ Vi. Among the finite set {li, i ∈ I} of lotteries there
is a best lottery l∗ and a worst one l∗, such that l∗ L li L l∗. Due to the monotonicity
axiom A4, we have
∑
i l∗ ⊗ Vi  σ 
∑
i l
∗ ⊗ Vi. Note that these three Q-lotteries have
the same base V . So we can apply Claim 1. By the representation there, we obtain:
uV(l∗) ≤
∑
i
uV(mi)µV(i) ≤ uV(l∗).
By linearity, we obtain α ∈ [0, 1] such that ∑i uV(mi)µV(i) = αuV(l∗) + (1− α)uV(l∗) =
uV(l) where l = αl∗+ (1−α)l∗. Finally, by Claim 1, we obtain σ ≈
∑
i l⊗Vi and, by A5,
σ ≈ l ⊗H. 
Claim 3. uV is independent of the OD upon which it is built in Claim 2.
Proof. Due to A5, each of the functions uV represents the preference L on the ∆(X).
Therefore (due to the uniqueness part of the von Neumann and Morgenstern theorem) we
obtain that all these functions uV are positive affine transformations of each other. Since
they are normalized, they are in fact equal to each other. 
From now on, we use the notation µV to denote the function mapping each Vi ∈ V to
µV({i}). So, with a slight abuse of notation, we have
Definition. Let us call the number UV(σ) =
∑
i u(li)µV(Vi) by V-utility value of
Q-lottery σ =
∑
i li ⊗ Vi based on OD V = (Vi, i ∈ I).
From Claim 1 follows that V-utility values allows to compare Q-lotteries based on V .
But we assert that it allows to compare any Q-lotteries.
Claim 4. Let σ =
∑
i li ⊗ Vi be a Q-lottery with the base V = (Vi, i ∈ I) and
τ =
∑
jmi ⊗ Wj be a Q-lottery with the base W = (Wj, j ∈ J). Then σ  τ iff
UV(σ) ≤ UW(τ).
Proof. Due to Claim 2, the lottery σ is equivalent to some lottery l ⊗H and, conse-
quently, to the lottery
∑
i l ⊗ Vi. Therefore, UV(σ) = UV(
∑
i l ⊗ Vi) = u(l). Similarly, if
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τ is equivalent to m⊗H, then its W-utility value is equal to u(m). Now
σ  τ ⇔ l ⊗H  m⊗H ⇔ u(l) ≤ u(m)⇔ UV(σ) ≤ UW(τ).
Claim 5. For any event V , the number µV(V ) does not depend on OD V (which
contains V ). In other words, let V = (V1, . . . , Vn) and W = (W1, . . . ,Wp) be two ODs,
and assume that V1 = W1 = V . Then µV(V ) = µW(V ).
Proof. Let us consider the Q-lottery l∗⊗V1+
∑n
i=2 l∗⊗Vi with the base V . Its V-utility
is equal to u(l∗)µV(V1) +
∑n
i=2 u(l∗)µV(Vi) = µV(V ). Now let us define the auxiliary OD
R = (V, V ⊥) and the corresponding Q-lottery l∗ ⊗ V + l∗ ⊗ V ⊥. Due to axiom A5 it is
equivalent to the first lottery. Therefore its R-utility (which equals µR(V )) is, by Claim
4, equal to µV(V ). The same applies to W and gives µV(V ) = µR(V ) = µW(V ). 
Thus, we have a system of numbers µ(V ), where V runs over P(H). Obviously, it
forms a probability measure on P(H). And due to Claim 4, the utility Uu,µ represents the
preference  on QL(H). The uniqueness of µ follows easily from Claim 1. 
Theorem 1 establishes that the axioms characterizing expected utility over quantum
lotteries are very similar to the ones used by Anscombe-Aumann in a classical uncertainty
context. In fact axioms A2 to A4 is a straightforward generalization of their corresponding
axioms to the case when lotteries are defined on the same OD. Axiom A5 which links
preferences over lotteries defined on different OD is specific to our setting. It is implicitly
satisfied in the classical uncertainty context.
5 Reformulation in terms of Hermitian operators
In this section, we start by reformulating all the ingredients of our decision theory in terms
of operators. While expressing the theory in terms of events is more intuitive and closer
to the standard formulation, operators are easier to work with. Moreover as we address
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the issue of defining what a quantum lottery conditional on new information means, we
cannot but resort to operators. As we show this is without loss of generality in the
static context. In the dynamic context, the two formulations are equivalent under axiom
A1-A5. Besides operators have a nice dynamic flavor better suited to the non-classical
environment. In that context an event ”happens” (as the result of a measurement) rather
than pre-existed as in the classical model of the world.
5.1 Basic notions in terms of operators
Let V be an event, that is a (closed) vector subspace in H. Let prV be the operator of
orthogonal projection of H on V . This means that, for any h ∈ H, prV (h) is a unique
vector in V such that h− prV (h) is orthogonal to V . It is easy to check that
a) prV is a linear operator;
b) prV (h) = h if and only if h ∈ V ; so that prV prV = prV ;
c) (prV (v), w) = (v, prV (w)) for all v, w ∈ H (this property is called Hermitian).
For simplicity, an operator with the properties a) - c) will be called a projector. Con-
versely, let P be a projector in H. Let us associate to it the event-subspace V = {v ∈
H,Pv = v}. We assert that P = prV . This follows from the fact that P (w) = 0 iff w is
orthogonal to V which in turn follows from the Hermitian quality of P .
This construction allows to identify events and projectors. In addition
1) Projectors P and Q are orthogonal when PQ = 0.
2) The opposite (to P ) projector is E − P , where E is the identity operator on H.
3) If projectors P and Q are orthogonal to each other then the operator P + Q
corresponds to the sum of the events.
4) If projectors P and Q commute then their product PQ is a projector as well and
corresponds to the intersection of the events.
In light of the identification between events and operators, we reformulate an orthog-
onal decomposition (OD) as follows
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Definition. An orthogonal decomposition of the unit (ODU) is a finite collection
(Pi, i ∈ I) of projectors which satisfies two properties:
(a) PiPj = 0 for i 6= j;
(b)
∑
i Pi = E.
Since OD (Vi, i ∈ I) and ODU (Pi, i ∈ I) are equivalent objects, we now express an
quantum lottery as follows.
A quantum lottery
∑
i xi⊗Vi with OD (Vi, i ∈ I) as its base and with an accompanying
collection of prizes (xi, i ∈ I) can be equivalently expressed as
∑
i xi⊗Pi where (Pi, i ∈ I)
is an ODU and Pi = prVi .
5.2 Belief operators
Theorem 1 above shows that the construction of an expected utility may be divided into
two independent parts: the utility of roulette lotteries u and the ”probabilistic” part
expressed by the measure µ. What the utility function concerns everything is clear. In
contrast, the probability measure µ on the lattice P(H) leaves some questions unanswered.
Indeed we do not know how to construct such a measure, how many such measures exist
and what we can do with them. In this section we provide an answer to these questions.
We first recall some basic properties of Hermitian operators.
Definition. A linear mapping (operator) A : H → H is called Hermitian if
(Av,w) = (v, Aw)
for any v, w ∈ H.
As before, (Av, v) = (v, Av) is a real number for any v ∈ H. The set Herm(H) of
Hermitian operators on H is a vector space, but over the field R of real numbers. As
we have seen, projectors are Hermitian operators. Therefore any linear combination of
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projectors with real coefficients also is a Hermitian operator. The following theorem, a
key result in the theory of Hermitian operators, states that any Hermitian operator is
obtained by such a way.
The Spectral Theorem. Let A be an Hermitian operator on (finite-dimensional)
Hilbert space H. Then there exists a (finite) ‘spectral’ representation
A =
∑
i
aiPi,
where (Pi, i ∈ I) is an ODU, and ai are real numbers.
Equivalently, A can be represented by a diagonal matrix (with real diagonal members)
in some orthogonal basis of H. An Hermitian operator A is non-negative (A ≥ 0) if
(Av, v) ≥ 0 for all v ∈ H. In terms of the spectral theorem, this is equivalent to all ai ≥ 0.
Definition. For a given function u : ∆ (X)→ R, the shadow operator of a Q-lottery
σ =
∑
i li ⊗ Pi is the Hermitian operator Opu(σ) given by the formula:
Opu(σ) =
∑
i
u(li)Pi.
As we will see, the utility of a Q-lottery is fully determined by its shadow operator..
The trace of an operator. For an arbitrary (not necessary Hermitian) operator D on
a (finite-dimensional) vector space H, there is the trace Tr(D). More precisely, the trace
is defined for a square matrix as the sum of its diagonal members. But it is well known
that this definition is correct for operators (that is independently of the choice of basis).
This follows from the following remarkable fact: Tr(AB) = Tr(BA) for any operators A
and B. Of course, the trace of an operator linearly depends on this operator. Finally, the
trace of an operator with spectral decomposition
∑
i aiPi is equal to
∑
i airk(Pi) which
implies the non-negativity of the trace of non-negative operators.
Definition. A belief operator is an Hermitian non-negative operator with the trace
19
1.
Remark. In quantum physics such operators are called ”states” or density operators.
We call them ‘beliefs’ (or cognitive state) because they allow constructing subjective
probability measures in a most suitable way. Indeed, let D be a belief operator, for an
event V , we denote µD(V ) = Tr(prVD). It denotes the subjective probability for event
V when the cognitive state is D.
Proposition 2.
1) This system of numbers is a probability measure on P(H).
2) Different belief operators define different probability measures.
3) If dimH ≥ 3 then every probability measure on P(H) has the form µD for a (unique)
belief operator D.
Proof. 1) Every number µD(V ) = Tr(PD), where P = prV , is non-negative. Indeed,
Tr(PD) = Tr(PPD) = Tr(PDP ) but PDP is a Hermitian and non-negative operator.
While µD(H) = 1 since µD(H) = Tr(ED) = Tr(D) = 1.
2) Suppose that two belief operators D and D′ generate the same measure, µD =
µD′ = µ. Let A = D −D′ and let A =
∑
i aiPi be a spectral representation of A. Then
Tr(AD) =
∑
i aiTr(PiD) =
∑
i aiTr(PiD
′) = Tr(AD′). Therefore, Tr(AD − AD′) =
Tr(AA) = 0. But Tr(A2) =
∑
i a
2
i rk(Pi), from where we have ai = 0 for every i ∈ I and
A = 0.
3) It is the famous Gleason’s theorem. 
Fix u and µ = µD. Then let U = U(u,µ). We have: U(σ) = Tr(Op
u(σ)D). So indeed
the utility of a Q-lottery is fully determined by its shadow operator.
Collecting all together we obtain4
Theorem 2. Let  be a nice binary preference relation on the set QL(H). Assume
dim(H) ≥ 3. Then there exists an affine utility function u on ∆ (X) and a belief operator
4A similar result can be found in Gyltenberg and Hansen (2012) relying on other axioms. In particular
in place of their axioms of Indifference and Separation, we use our No-framing axiom.
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D such that  is given by the function Uu,D : σ 7→ Tr(Opu(σ)D). If the preference relation
 is not trivial then D is unique and u is unique up to positive affine transformation.
Theorem 2 uses the language of operators to make the representation in Theorem 1
more precise. It allows to fully characterize the probability that captures the decision-
maker’s subjective beliefs in terms of a belief operator D. The operator Opu(σ) plays the
same role as the utility profile in Anscombe-Aumann and the expectation can be defined
as the trace of the product Opu(σ)D without loss of generality provided dim(H) ≥ 3.
Example 4. Let A = Opu(σ), the expected value of this lottery when the belief state
is D is Tr (AD) . For concreteness let us consider the case when D is a pure state that is
it corresponds to vector e ∈ H (of length 1, see Example 2). The belief operator D takes
the form of Pe : x → (x, e)e. In this case Tr (AD) = (Ae, e) . The quadratic form (Ae, e)
is interpreted as the utility value of lottery A when the DM’s cognitive state is given by
e.
Example 5. Consider again A = Opu(σ) now in the case when D = E/ dimH which
represents ”complete uncertainty” (cf. example 2). In the case of complete uncertainty
the expected utility value of lottery A is equal to Tr (A) / dimH, that is the arithmetic
average of the eigenvalues of operator A. In the general case the expected utility of A is a
convex combination of its eigenvalues. To see this we take the spectral decomposition of
A =
∑
i λiPi where λi are the eigenvalues of A, and Pi the projectors on the eigenspaces.
Then Tr (AD) =
∑
i λiTr (PiD) , where Tr (PiD) ≥ 0 and
∑
i Tr (PiD) = 1.
6 Dynamic consistency: the updating rule
Suppose that the beliefs of a dm are given by belief operator D. That is, our decision-
maker believes that the state of the measured quantum system is D. Alternatively, her
cognitive state is such that she assigns probabilities to events according to D. In the next
section we return to the notion of state which is delicate even in Quantum Mechanics and
21
to the interpretation of D in our context. But for now suppose that she (or someone else)
performs some measurement and learns as a result of the measurement that an event
W occurred. In short, she receives new information that the system has property W
represented by projector P . It is almost evident that her beliefs and preferences on Q-
lotteries should change, the question we ask in this section is how should her preferences
on quantum lotteries change after receiving that information? The objective is to secure
consistency between initial preferences and preferences conditional on new information.
In Quantum Mechanics, it is assumed that the state changes in accordance with the von
Neumann-Lu¨ders postulate. More precisely, a system that was in state D transits to the
state D′ = PDP/Tr(PDP ) as a result of performing a measurement that yields outcome
W . The operator PDP is Hermitian and non-negative ((PDPv, v) = (DPv, Pv) ≥ 0
by force of the nonnegativity of D); its trace is by definition equal to 1. Thus, D′ is
indeed a state. Here, we need to clarify why Tr(PDP ) is different from zero so we are
allowed to divide by this number. As a matter of fact, we understand Tr(PDP ) as the
probability to discover event P in cognitive state D. Thus, by analogy with standard
Bayesian updating, the von Neumann-Lu¨ders postulate focuses on cases where the state
assigns a positive probability to event P. If the trace Tr(PDP ) were equal to 0, that would
mean that something happened that has zero probability i.e., an event that is considered
impossible under the belief D. That is, the beliefs of our DM captured by the state D
are simply incorrect and she has to update in a more fundamental way.
We want to show that in quantum decision theory the beliefs change in the same way.
For that, we clearly have to require something. In order to understand what, we return
for a minute to the behavior of a classical decision-maker. She has preference between
functions (acts) defined on the set S of states of nature; suppose that she learns in addition
that the true state lies in some subset T ⊆ S. It is quite natural to assume that her new
preference depends only on values of these functions on the subset T . That is, only on
the restriction of the various functions to T .
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We should confess that we do not know how to define such a restriction in the quantum
case i.e., to define canonically a lottery σ|W =∑jmi ⊗Qj, where (Qj) form an ODU in
the Hilbert subspace W . The natural candidates Qi = PPi (where P is the projector on
W and PPi is a Hermetian operator in space W ) are generally not projectors and do not
commute with each other.
The only case when we can apply this approach without problem is when projector
P = prW on W commutes with any of the projectors Pi. In this case we can set σ|W =∑
i li ⊗ PPi (here we interpret PPi as an operator on W , because PPi(w) lies in W ).
Indeed, PPi are Hermitian projectors, and their sum is equal to P , the identity operator
in W . This definition is consistent with the classical case discussed above. Note finally,
that in this case we have
Opu(σ|W ) =
∑
i∈I′
PPiu(li) = P (
∑
i∈I
u(li) Pi) = POp
u(σ).
We want to use the property above to define a restriction in general case. Strictly
speaking, we will not define the restriction not of a Q-lottery, but of its shadow operator.
Since the utility of a lottery only depends on its shadow operator, this is sufficient for our
purpose. For any Hermitian operator A on H we define A|W as operator PA, which is an
operator in subspace W . As an operator in W , it is Hermitian. Indeed, for any v, w ∈ W ,
(PAv,w) = (Av, Pw) = (Av,w) = (v, Aw) = (Pv,Aw) = (v, PAw).
For some reason, it is easier and more practical for us to work with operators on H.
We shall denote with A||W the Hermitian operator PAP in H. This operator has the
same restriction to W as A. Moreover, it is equal to 0 on the ortho-complementation W⊥
of W in H.
Definition The restriction of Hermitian operator A to a subspace W is defined as the
Hermitian operator PAP where P = prW . We denote it by A||W .
23
Two features justify this definition. First, the restriction is equal to zero on the
orthogonal complement of W. Consider a (unitary) vector e orthogonal to W that is
Pe = 0. Then (PAPe, e) = (PA0, e) = (0, e) = 0. Next, the restriction coincides with A
on W. Consider again a (unitary) vector e in W, that is Pe = e. Then
(PAPe, e) = (APe, Pe) = (Ae, e) .
So the operator A||W coincides with A, when the (pure) states is in W, and is equal to
zero when the states are orthogonal to W .
Let us go back to the question concerning the change of in ”nice” preference  after
learning that event W occurs. The new preference will be denoted as W . We assume
that each of  and W is nice and nontrivial. Let (u,D) and (uW , DW ) be two pairs
providing a nice representation as in Theorem 2 for  and W respectively.
Our first, ”stability” (ST), axiom expresses the hypothesis that the taste for prizes
should be stable and independent of information. More precisely:
ST For any l,m ∈ ∆(X), l ⊗H %W m⊗H ⇐⇒ l ⊗H % m⊗H.
It is easy to see that Axiom ST is equivalent to u and uW being positive affine trans-
formations of each other. From now on, we will assume without loss of generality that
u = uW .
Our second axiom, ”consistent updating” (CU) captures the requirement that prefer-
ences should remain consistent as the agent acquires information.
CU Let σ, τ, σ′, τ ′ ∈ QL such that Opu (σ′) = Opu (σ) ||W and Opu (τ ′) = Opu (τ) ||W,
then σ W τ if and only if σ′  τ ′.
First, note that, in this axiom, σ′ can be thought of as a Q-lottery that yields the same
utilities as σ if W obtains and 0 otherwise. Likewise, τ ′ can be thought of as a Q-lottery
24
that yields the same utilities as τ if W obtains and 0 otherwise. Therefore, σ′ and τ ′ yield
the same utilities over W⊥. Now, to understand this axiom, it is helpful to decompose it
into two parts. The first part relates to the idea of consistency: since σ′ and τ ′ yield the
same utilities over W⊥, it is indeed a matter of consistency to require ex ante and ex post
preferences over σ′ and τ ′ to agree ; that is, to impose σ′ W τ ′ ⇐⇒ σ′  τ ′. Roughly,
this first part corresponds to what Ghirardato (2002) calls dynamic consistency (see his
Axiom 2). Moreover, note that by construction σ and σ′ yield the same utilities over W ,
therefore it is natural to require indifference conditional on W . Since the same reasoning
applies to τ and τ ′, we require σ′ ∼W σ and τ ′ ∼W τ . This second argument corresponds
to consequentialism (see Ghirardato’s Axiom 7). Combining these two arguments, we
finally get the equivalence between σ W τ and σ′  τ ′, as required by CU. In example
6 below we return to this discussion more formally.
Theorem 3. Assume that Tr(PDP ) > 0. Then Axiom CU holds if and only if the
belief operator is updated into DW = (D||W ) /Tr(D||W ) = PDP/Tr(PDP ).
Proof. Assume Axiom CU. Then, for any σ,τ ∈ QL, denoteOpu (σ) = A andOpu (τ) =
B, for A,B ∈ Herm(H). Let σ′, τ ′ ∈ QL such that Opu (σ′) = A||W and Opu (τ ′) =
B||W :
σ W τ ⇐⇒ σ′  τ ′ ⇐⇒ Tr((A||W )D) ≤ Tr((A||W )D)
But note that Tr(PAPD) = Tr(A(PDP )), and similarly forB. Moreover, Tr(PDP ) > 0.
Therefore, and using linearity as well, we have
σ W τ ⇐⇒ Tr(A(PDP )/Tr(PDP )) ≤ Tr(B(PDP )/Tr(PDP )).
By the uniqueness part of the Theorem 2, we obtain DW = (PDP )/Tr(PDP ). Now
assume DW = (PDP )/Tr(PDP ). Note that, for any A ∈ Herm(H), we have
Tr(ADW ) = Tr((A||W )D)/Tr(PDP ).
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This follows from the equality Tr(APDP ) = Tr(PAPD), which is true due to the com-
mutativity of the trace. Axiom CU is then a simple consequence.
It is well-known (Ghirardato 2002) that Bayesian updating of beliefs secures dynamic
consistency of preferences in a classical uncertainty context. Theorem 3 establishes that
the von Neumann-Lu¨ders postulate similarly secures dynamic consistency of preferences
(axiom CU) in a non-classical (quantum) uncertainty environment.
In the remaining of the paper we use the ”shadow” operator expression for lotteries:
A = Opu (σ) and as defined in Theorem 2 the utility of such a lottery under belief D is
equal to U (A) = Tr(AD). We next comment on our result in Theorem 3.
Generally, new information arises as the outcome of some ”informational” measure-
ment. Some measurement, represented by an ODU (Pi, i ∈ I) is performed. If, as the
result of this measurement, we obtain outcome i, the system transits into subspace
W = Im(Pi) and, in accordance with Theorem 3, the belief-state D changes (is updated)
into Di = PiDPi/Tr (PiD) . Note that the number Tr (PiD) is precisely the probability
(under belief D) for the realization of outcome i when performing our measurement; we
denote it by pi. Without loss of generality we can assume that these numbers are strictly
positive, except for ”impossible” results.
The utility of ”lottery” A, after the DM received the information about the realization
of outcome i, is now equal to Ui (A) = Tr(ADi). It may clearly be either larger or smaller
than the initial U (A) . And as we shall see the connection between these two utilities
i.e., ex-ante and ex-post is not straightforward in general except for two cases: when our
measurement (Pi, i ∈ I) is compatible with either the lottery or the belief state i.e., when
all the Pi, i ∈ I commute with either operator A or D.
Proposition 3. Assume that our measurement is compatible with either operator A
or D. Then we have the following formula
U (A) =
∑
i
Tr (PiD) Tr (ADi) =
∑
i
piUi (A) .
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Proof. Assume that A commutes with Pi, PiA = APi. Since E =
∑
Pi we have
U (A) = Tr(AD) = Tr(
∑
i
PiAD)
Since the Pi are projectors we have that PiAD = PiPiAD = PiAPiD. Therefore
Tr(
∑
i PiAD) =i Tr(PiAPiD) =i Tr(APiDPi) = piTr(ADi). This gives us the formula in
Proposition 3. Assume now that D commutes with the Pi. Then we have
U (A) = Tr(AD) = Tr(A(
∑
i
PiD)) =i Tr(APiPiD) =
iTr(PiAPiD) = ipiTr(ADi) =i piU (Ai) .
To put it differently the ex-ante utility is equal to the weighted sum of ex-post utilities
with the weights equal to the probabilities pi for the different outcome i when performing
our (intermediary) measurement. From this formula we see immediately that we obtain
a relationship reminding of the ”Sure Thing Principle” referred to as ”recursive dynamic
consistency” in its dynamic version. The idea is that if lottery A provides ex-post a
higher utility than B whatever the outcome i of an intermediary measurement, then
lottery A is preferred to B ex-ante. We want emphasize that this is true only under the
condition that all the Pi, i ∈ I commute with either operator A or D. In the general case
”recursive dynamic consistency” is violated in our setting as we show next with a simple
two-dimensional example.
Example 6. LetH be a two dimensional Hilbert space with orthonormal basis (e1, e2).
Let A be a projector on e1, i.e., an operator of the form A =
1 0
0 0
 . Consider A as
a lottery that gives a utility equal to 1 in state e1 and 0 otherwise. Consider another
lottery-operator B =
0 0
0 1
 that gives utility 1 in state e2 and 0 otherwise. Assume
now that our DM’s belief-state is given by D = A. Then clearly the expected utility of
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lottery A is equal to 1 and the expected utility of B is equal to zero. So our DM strictly
prefers A to B.
Assume now that we perform a measurement defined by the ODU (P1, P2) where
P1 =
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
 and P2 =
 1/2 −1/2
−1/2 1/2
 . If the outcome of the measurement
is 1, the updated belief-state is given by operator D1 = P1DP1/Tr (P1DP1) ,which as
can be seen easily is equal to P1. The expected utility in the belief-state is U1 (A) =
Tr(AD1) = Tr(AP1) = 1/2. And similarly if we obtain the complementary result 2,
the belief-state is updated to D2 =
P2DP2
Tr(P2DP2)
and the corresponding expected utility is
U2 (A) = Tr(AD2) = Tr(AP2) = 1/2. So we see that for any one of the two possible
outcomes the value of the A lottery goes from 1 to 1/2. With the same reasoning we
obtain that U1 (B) = Tr(BD1) = Tr(BP1) = 1/2 = U2 (B) . So the two lotteries A and
B yield the same expected utility. This violates ”recursive dynamic consistency”: lottery
A is ex-post indifferent to be B whatever the outcome of the measurement, yet ex-ante it
is strictly preferred. This violation occurs because the intermediary measurement (P1, P2)
is incompatible with either A or B and D.
This simple example allows illustrating yet one feature that lacks counter-part in the
classical model. Imagine that we perform the measurement described above but our DM
is not informed of the result. She only knows the measurement has been made. In the
classical world such an information does not affect the DM’s belief or the expected value of
the lotteries. However in our ”quantum” context the DM understands that for any of the
two outcome (1 or 2) the expected value of lottery A has changed from 1 to 1/2. Therefore,
independently of her (lack of) knowledge about the outcome of the measurement, she will
revise her belief-state only because she knows that this specific measurement has been
performed. The new belief-state is D′ = p1D1 + p2D2 = 1/2E which corresponds to
”uniform ignorance”. And in this belief-state the expected utility of lottery A is equal to
Tr (AD′) = 1/2Tr (AE) = 1/2.
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7 Discussion: quantum cognition and rationality
In this section we return to the question as to when extending expected utility theory to
a non-classical uncertainty environment may be valuable i.e., what kind of situations does
it address.
We start with a short discussion of the notion of belief-state or cognitive state. It
must be emphasized that even in Quantum Mechanics, the notion of state is far from
transparent. Does the state pertain to the system? Or does it pertain to the observer and
encapsulates his knowledge about a system? In the classical world everything is clear. The
system is endowed with properties and our beliefs about the system reflect exclusively our
(incomplete) information about that system. A key insight of QM is that we cannot as
in the classical world always separate the system from its observer and the measurement
operations he undertakes. As in the classical world, the cognitive state encapsulates our
information about the system but unlike the classical world our attempts to learn more
by means of measurements affect the system so its properties change. This applies when
the system itself is quantum e.g., some subatomic particle. But why is that relevant to
decision theory? Indeed lotteries are generally not defined on states of subatomic particles.
Quantum cognition
As mentioned in the Introduction, there has been a number of works in decision theory
both theoretical and experimental developing the idea that the (quantum) indeterminacy
of preferences can explain a number of behavioral anomalies. Although this is different
from what we do in this paper it is relevant to our current concern in the following way.
The uncertainty relevant to our decision-maker may concern other agents’ preferences
e.g., in an interactive i.e., game situation. The type indeterminacy approach (Lambert-
Mogiliansky, Zamir, and Zwirn (2009)) identifies the choices made by other agents as the
outcomes of some measurement of their preferences. That is the choice made by another
player is the new information upon which our decision-maker must update his belief-state.
The present work characterizes how a player should update her beliefs about the other
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agents’ indeterminate preferences. In so doing the present paper is a contribution to an
emerging literature on games with quantum-like players.
A most important field of application lies within quantum cognition where agents’
quantum-like characteristics apply to their beliefs or representation/perception of the
world. Interestingly it is also consistent with an interpretation of quantum mechanics
according to which the weird features of quantum mechanics do not belong to ”the world
out there” but to the world that we can access with our mind and instruments. In fact
it is argued that whether or not there exists an objective world is not relevant because
the only ways to access it induces a relationship between us and the world where the two
are impossible to disentangle (cf. Bitbol (2009)). Most importantly for us is that the
world that matters to decision-making is the perceived world, that is the world that we
can access with our human mind and measurement instruments.
It is uncontroversial to assert that in order to assess the world we build a representa-
tion of it, a ”represented world” which is a mental construct. In classical standard theory,
the represented world reflects our incomplete knowledge about the world expressed in
our beliefs and these beliefs (should) evolve according to Bayes’ rule in response to new
information. In contrast the quantum cognitive approach is based on two observations: 1.
People have difficulties to represent themselves a complex object. What people do is to
consider a complex object from different perspective - one at a time; 2. People have diffi-
culty in combining perspectives i.e., to synthesize all relevant information into one single
coherent representation of the complex object. Quantum cognition models these difficulties
by analogy with incompatible properties in Quantum Mechanics: different perspectives
may be incompatible in the mind but they complement each other by contributing with
information. Non-commutativity in information processing (updating) results from the
conjunction of on the one hand the incompatibility of perspectives and on the other hand
the oneness of the mental picture: when you learn something in one perspective, this
affects your whole representation so you actually may lose information regarding aspects
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previously ”known” in other incompatible perspectives: learning a new feature perturbs
the whole mental construct. One example is in the article about doctors’ diagnosis men-
tioned in the Introduction.5 Let us see how it connects to the subject matter of this
article.
The experiment started with the doctors learning the patient chief complaint. This
created an initial and common cognitive state D and associated common preferences.
Presumably they all wanted to see the patient recover health. Thereafter one group
learned the results (W ) of a physical examination (”hot” data) and the other group the
result (V ) of laboratory test (”cold” data). In our terminology, this amounts to observing
the outcomes of the measurement of two possibly incompatible mental perspectives. The
new information modified the doctors’ initial cognitive state intoD′1 for the first and D
′
2 for
the second group. The two groups were then given the information received by the other
group and again revised their belief-state into D”1 and D
”
2 respectively. Thereafter they
had to decide about the likelihood of urinary track infection implying a recommendation
for treatment i.e., a decision with random payoff (a Q-lottery). The experiment shows
that the two groups decided significantly differently. The doctors ended up revealing
different preferences solely due to the order in which they processed information. In our
setting this can happen when V and W belong to incompatible perspectives represented
by non-commuting operators. As a consequence of updating according Theorem 3 we
can have D”1 6= D”2 implying distinct associated revealed preferences for each group. The
results in this experiment are thus consistent with the incompatibility in the mind of the
”cold” laboratory data perspective and the ”hot” physical examination perspective.6
The concept of rationality used in economics involves an implicit assumption of the
existence of an independent reality. Quantum Mechanics taught us that whether or not
5Similar effects have been exhibited in experiment related to how judges’ and jury’s decisions. The
decisions were shown to be significantly dependent on the order in which argument were presented e.g.,
first defense and than accusation or the other way around.
6Other experiments have shown that even a person’s physiological response to e.g., a pain stimuli can
depend on similar (contextual) factors (see e.g., Zimbardo et al. 1969).
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such reality exists may not be possible to assess. This is because we cannot access reality
independently from our efforts to measure it and those efforts can perturb it: information
is contextual that is relative to the measurement performed on the system. An event
that is true in the sense that it has been revealed as the result of some measurement
may very well cease to be true in another context that is after another measurement. In
our setting this translates into the failure of recursive dynamic consistency as shown in
section 6. It may seem odd that our consistency axiom CU allows for such departures.
But the appeal of recursive dynamic consistency is based upon the implicit assumption
that ”the act the agent performs has no effect on the resolution of uncertainty” (cf.
Fishburn in the Introduction). However, the resolution of uncertainty is - in our setting
- affected by the act that is selected and the measurements it entails (as well as by other
measurements) performed to acquire new information. Once this is taken into account,
recursive dynamic consistency loses much of its appeal. Our results demonstrate that
an individual can behave rationally that is dynamically consistently in a world that she
represents himself as non-separable from ”the act she selects” (cf Fishburn 1970). In
future research, we aim at exploring further the implications for human decision-making
of a full-fledged concept of rationality based on non-classical(quantum) logic.
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have established rules for rational choice behavior in a non-classical
uncertainty environment. We introduced the concept of quantum lottery and formulated
sufficient and necessary conditions for choice behavior to be representable by an expected
utility function. We also derived from a requirement of dynamic consistency an updating
rule that secures that choice behavior conditional on new information is consistent with
ex-ante contingent preferences.
We found that most of the classical axioms of decision theory carry over to the context
of quantum lotteries. This is because all but one axiom can be formulated in terms of a
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single orthogonal decomposition of the state space. When considering a single orthogonal
decomposition, quantum lotteries operating in the Hilbert space are equivalent to roulette
lotteries in a classical state space. This equivalence mirrors the equivalence between
classical measurements and compatible quantum measurements. An additional axiom
is required to secure that the probability for any specific event does not depend on the
particular lottery that it belongs to. The necessity to impose that axiom stems from the
fact that while it is trivially true in the classical world, it is not necessary so in our more
general setting.
A most interesting result is that the von Neumann-Lu¨ders postulate which is central
to Quantum Mechanics and informs about the impact of a measurement on the state of
a system can be derived from a consistency requirement on choice behavior. When the
belief-state (cognitive state) is updated according to the postulate, the agent conditional
preferences reflect a single preference order. In order to establish that result we had to
confine ourselves to a restricted class of preferences i.e., those satisfying our axioms. This
restriction is needed because the concept of conditional lottery is not well-defined for
general quantum lotteries. It is however well-defined for Hermitian operators which rep-
resent quantum lotteries satisfying our axioms. Interestingly, we find that in contrast with
classical subjective expected utility theory, the dynamic consistency of preferences does
not entail the so-called recursive dynmamic consistency. This distinction is an expression
of the fundamental distinction between the two settings namely that the resolution of
uncertainty depends on the operation(s) performed to resolve it.
This exercise contributes to decision theory by extending expected utility theory to
non-classical (quantum) uncertainty. It also contributes to behavioral economics by pro-
viding further foundations for the quantum cognitive approach. As we argue in the In-
troduction and in the Discussion this approach is facing a growing recognition due to its
success in explaining behavioral anomalies as well as its deeper meaning and psychological
interpretation.
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